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EXTENDING HOPE INTO “THE HOLE”:
APPLYING GRAHAM V. FLORIDA TO SUPERMAX PRISONS
Joseph B. Allen*

INTRODUCTION
In 2000, a twenty-year-old inmate named David Tracy hung himself in a
Virginia “supermax” facility with only a few months left on a two-and-a-half year
prison sentence for a minor drug charge.1 As alleged in a lawsuit brought by Tracy’s
parents, a prison guard happened on the scene as the suicide attempt began and called
for assistance.2 Three medical workers arrived but made no immediate effort to save
Tracy’s life, instead waiting until a team of eight guards assembled outside the cell,
placed an electro-shield over Tracy’s body, and shackled his legs in iron chains.3 The
Virginia prison in question, Wallens Ridge State Prison, and its counterpart, Red Onion
State Prison, are both notorious for causing criminals much more hardened than Tracy
to “crack[ ] up.”4
This Note proposes expanding the reach of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause to prohibit extended detentions in supermax prisons for nonviolent offenders,
such as Tracy, on the basis of Graham v. Florida5 and minimal culpability. The harsh
isolation techniques Tracy experienced are part of the common United States practice
of employing supermax prisons to house a substantial portion of an overcrowded inmate population in solitary confinement.6 In the words of the Supreme Court, supermax
* J.D., William & Mary School of Law, 2012; B.B.A., College of William & Mary, 2009.
The author thanks his parents and sister for their support, his friends for their distractions,
and his Notes Editor John Mulligan for his helpful comments.
1
Alan Elsner, Supermax Prisons: A Growing Human Rights Issue, CHAMPION MAGAZINE,
Aug. 2004, at 36, available at http://www.nacdl.org/Champion.aspx?id=1331; David Fathi,
Supermax Prisons: Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION: BLOG
OF RIGHTS (July 9, 2010, 2:39 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/prisoners-rights/supermax
-prisons-cruel-inhuman-and-degrading.
2
Laurence Hammack, $750,000 Settlement for Prison Suicide, THE ROANOKE TIMES,
Apr. 11, 2002, http://www.koskoff.com/news/detail.cfm?aID=51.
3
Id.
4
Craig Timberg, At Va.’s Toughest Prison, Tight Controls, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 1999,
at C1.
5
130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
6
See Tracy Hresko, In the Cellars of the Hollow Men: Use of Solitary Confinement in U.S.
Prisons and its Implications Under International Laws Against Torture, 18 PACE INT’L L. REV.
1, 3, 7–8 (2006); Elizabeth Vasiliades, Solitary Confinement and International Human Rights:
Why the U.S. Prison System Fails Global Standards, 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 71, 73–75 (2005).
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prisons are “maximum-security facilities with highly restrictive conditions, designed
to segregate the most dangerous prisoners from the general prison population.”7 Once
placed in a supermax, “[i]nmates are deprived of almost any environmental or sensory
stimuli and of almost all human contact,”8 often restricted to small cells for up to
twenty-three hours a day.9 Although states originally designed the facilities for only the
most dangerous and violent inmates, lower threat-level inmates occasionally find themselves assigned to supermax facilities for prolonged periods of time.10
Other legal approaches to the issue of prolonged solitary confinement have failed
to move the debate in recent years,11 with the split occurring roughly along political
lines in classic legal realist fashion.12 On the left, the constitutional issue is framed
as whether Supermax prisons constitute torture,13 and legal challenges focus on the
“wanton infliction of pain” line of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, as well as international laws against torture.14 These challenges collide with the Right’s practical deference to prison administrators in the trenches and staunch hostility to foreign influence
over domestic legal decisions.15 The Left has argued that the use of such extreme punishments should be limited to higher-profile inmates whose atrocious crimes have
arguably left the correctional system little choice other than a supermax.16 The Right
7

Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 209 (2005).
Id.
9
Jerry R. DeMaio, Comment, If You Build It, They Will Come: The Threat of
Overclassification in Wisconsin’s Supermax Prison, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 207, 207 (2001).
10
See Jamie Fellner, Red Onion State Prison: Super-Maximum Security Confinement in
Virginia, Admission and Release, HUMAN RTS. WATCH,(Apr. 1999), http://www.hrw.org
/reports/1999/redonion/Rospfin-04.htm#P209_39730 (quoting former Virginia Governor James
Gilmore as stating in 1999 “that felons caught with guns who qualify for a five-year mandatory
sentence would be eligible for incarceration” in the state’s two Supermax facilities).
11
See infra Part II.D (discussing other attempted legal causes of action from inmates
challenging solitary confinement).
12
See generally Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI.
L. REV. 831, 838 (2008) (observing that judges are more likely to cast votes in the same
political direction as the party that appointed them).
13
See Atul Gawande, Hellhole: The United States Holds Tens of Thousands of Inmates
in Long-Term Solitary Confinement. Is This Torture?, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 30, 2009,
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/03/30/090330fa_fact_gawande; Sonja Starr,
Solitary Confinement: Possibly Torture, Definitely Hell, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Apr. 1, 2009,
10:43 PM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/04/solitary_confin_1.html.
14
See Jules Lobel, Prolonged Solitary Confinement and the Constitution, 11 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 115, 119–25 (2008).
15
See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297, 303 (1991). In this majority opinion, Justice
Scalia requires inmates challenging the conditions of their confinement to prove “deliberate
indifference” on behalf of prison officials to their plight before a court can allow an Eighth
Amendment claim to move forward. Id. at 297.
16
See Stephanie Chen, ‘Terrible Tommy’ Spends 27 Years in Solitary Confinement,
CNN.COM (Feb. 25, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-02-25/justice/colorado.supermax
.silverstein.solitary_1_solitary-confinement-federal-prison-system-cell?_s=PM:CRIME
8
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has an easy foil to this argument in the Supreme Court’s general acceptance of capital
punishment17—if the Eighth Amendment permits the imposition of the death penalty,
certainly extended solitary confinement is acceptable.18 Meanwhile, the Right’s emphasis on prison safety has no application to nonviolent inmates such as Tracy, who
pose no real threat to the safety of those around them.
A recent Supreme Court decision may show a constitutional route through this judicial roadblock, however, and potentially bring relief to inmates undeservedly housed
in supermax prisons. In Graham v. Florida, the Supreme Court noted that “cases
addressing the proportionality of sentences fall within two general classifications,”
with the latter constituting rulings that impose “categorical restrictions on the death
penalty.”19 In Graham, however, the Court addressed a lawsuit seeking a categorical
restriction on a mere term-of-years sentence, which the Court admitted was “an issue
[it had] not considered previously.”20 The Court ultimately ruled in favor of the petitioner and created a categorical restriction prohibiting life sentences without parole
for juvenile offenders convicted of crimes other than homicide.21
This Note proposes a similar categorical restriction challenge for inmates assigned
to supermax prisons that would prohibit prolonged solitary confinement as cruel and
unusual punishment for individuals either below the age of majority and/or convicted
of a nonviolent crime. The narrow scope of the argument acknowledges the extremely
small likelihood that the Supreme Court will come anywhere close to declaring prolonged solitary confinement facially unconstitutional as long as the more severe alternative of capital punishment remains legal. The proposed new route addresses the
more immediate problem of over-classification—the assignment of prisoners to
supermax prisons who neither require nor deserve the brutal conditions of solitary
confinement22—and thus attempts to inject more proportionality into the United
States’ system of incarceration and imprisonment. The new route has the added
benefit of a closer alignment with international laws concerning torture and prisoner
treatment, with which the United States’ practice of solitary confinement is increasingly
out of line.23
Part I of this Note briefly describes the history and current practice of solitary confinement within the United States, as well as the problem of over-classification. Part II
analyzes relevant Eighth Amendment precedent and past attempts at alleviating the
(describing the incarceration of convicted murderer Tommy Silverstein, who has been under
a no-human-contact order for 27 years).
17
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976).
18
See id. at 188 (noting that “the penalty of death is different in kind from any other
punishment imposed under our system of criminal justice”).
19
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010).
20
Id. at 2022.
21
Id. at 2033–34.
22
DeMaio, supra note 9, at 209.
23
See Hresko, supra note 6, at 16–19; Vasiliades, supra note 6, at 79–85, 91–95.
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worst supermax conditions, demonstrating why a new proportionality-based approach is necessary. Part III lays out the proposal for a categorical restriction on
over-classification of inmates, tracing the route a future reviewing court may take
with a step-by-step analysis of Graham. Part III also illustrates the advantages of the
categorical restriction approach relative to a given-all-circumstances approach24 and
addresses potential counter-arguments from both practical and legal perspectives.
I. SUPERMAX PRISONS AND SOLITARY CONFINEMENT
A. History of Solitary Confinement
Solitary confinement has attracted controversy since its introduction to the United
States in the early 1800s.25 Quakers in Pennsylvania made the practice central to their
system of incarceration, constructing facilities such as Cherry Hill State Prison in
Philadelphia where all inmates began their incarceration in isolation.26 Several prominent visitors, including Charles Dickens, Charles Darwin, and Alexis de Tocqueville,
universally described the practice as a complete failure at rehabilitation.27 Dickens
stated, “I hold this slow and daily tampering with the mysteries of the brain, to be
immeasurably worse than any torture of the body”;28 Darwin was quoted as saying the
inmates were “dead to everything but torturing anxieties and horrible despair”;29 and
de Tocqueville noted the practice “does not reform, it kills.”30
The use of solitary confinement gradually declined for a long period in the later
1800s;31 this trend accelerated after the Supreme Court in In re Medley32 set free an
inmate, convicted of murder, who had been held in solitary confinement on ex post
facto grounds.33 The Court briefly discussed the practice of isolation in its opinion,
noting the terrible sufferings of prisoners and the then-recent decision of Great Britain
to abolish the punishment.34 In 1922, Justice Brandeis further emphasized the drastic
nature of solitary confinement as a punishment in his dissent to United States v.
Moreland,35 observing that state officials in the early American republic considered
24

See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021.
Hresko, supra note 6, at 6.
26
Id.; Lobel, supra note 14, at 118.
27
Hresko, supra note 6, at 6; Lobel, supra note 14, at 118.
28
Lobel, supra note 14, at 118.
29
Hresko, supra note 6, at 6.
30
Lobel, supra note 14, at 118.
31
Id.; Hresko, supra note 6, at 7.
32
134 U.S. 160 (1890).
33
Id. at 161, 173.
34
Id. at 168–70 (noting that “a considerable number of the prisoners . . . became violently
insane, others, still, committed suicide . . . .”).
35
258 U.S. 433 (1922).
25
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“solitary confinement without labor” to be the “most severe punishment inflicted,”
with the exception of death.36
The practice was revived in 1983 after a prison riot at a federal maximum-security
prison in Marion, Illinois, took the lives of two guards and an inmate.37 Immediately
thereafter, prison officials at the facility initiated the practice of holding every inmate
in solitary confinement indefinitely to maintain order.38 This policy achieved success
as a disciplinary method in immediately reducing violence and formed the model for
the modern supermax prison.39
B. Modern Supermax Practice
The Supreme Court has noted the large increase in the use of supermax prisons
over the past twenty years;40 the number now stands at thirty-six states operating such
institutions, as well as a federal facility in Florence, Colorado.41 The Supreme Court
attributed the increase to a “rise in prison gangs and prison violence,”42 though groups
such as the ACLU give credit to “the perpetual ‘tough on crime’ political bidding
war.”43 Regardless, all groups are in relative agreement on the severity of prison life
in the modern version of solitary confinement.44 In Wilkinson v. Austin, Justice Kennedy
wrote of an inmate’s daily life at Ohio State Penitentiary:
Inmates must remain in their cells, which measure 7 by 14 feet, for
23 hours per day. A light remains on in the cell at all times, though
it is sometimes dimmed, and an inmate who attempts to shield the
light to sleep is subject to further discipline. During the one hour
per day that an inmate may leave his cell, access is limited to one
of two indoor recreation cells.45
The federal facility in Florence, Colorado, in operation since 1994, attracts much
attention, possibly due to the notoriety of prisoners sent there.46 Cells in the facility are
36

Id. at 448–49 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Hresko, supra note 6, at 7.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 7–8.
40
Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 213 (2005).
41
Hresko, supra note 6, at 8.
42
Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 213.
43
Fathi, supra note 1.
44
The Supreme Court has unanimously taken notice of the extreme conditions imposed
on inmates in solitary confinement. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 214 (“Incarceration at OSP is
synonymous with extreme isolation . . . . It is fair to say OSP inmates are deprived of almost
any environmental or sensory stimuli and of almost all human contact.”).
45
Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 214.
46
See, e.g., Jeffrey Smith McLeod, Note, Anxiety, Despair, and the Maddening Isolation
of Solitary Confinement: Invoking the First Amendment’s Protection Against State Action That
37
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twelve feet by seven feet and contain a very small hole near the ceiling for inmates to
see the sky.47 An inmate is allowed one hour a day for exercise in a small fenced area
and receives food through a slot in the cell door without any contact from the guard.48
All inmates sent to Florence are required to go through an introductory period of two
years without human contact.49
There are several instances of inmates spending incredibly long periods of time
in isolation at such facilities. At Louisiana State Penitentiary in Angola, two inmates
have been isolated in non-air-conditioned cells for twenty-three hours a day since
they were accused of killing a prison guard in 1972.50 One prisoner is reported to
suffer from osteoarthritis, memory loss, and insomnia, whereas the other experiences
claustrophobia, anxiety, and insomnia.51 Another inmate, Tommy Silverstein, has been
held in several federal prisons in solitary confinement under a strict no-human-contact
order since 1983.52 Prison officials transferred him to the supermax in Marion, Illinois,
after he was convicted of the murder of another inmate; the conviction was later
overturned on the basis of faulty witness testimony.53 Once at Marion, however,
Silverstein was charged and convicted for murder again, although this time the
victims were a prison guard and two inmates, and the evidence was uncontroverted.54
Silverstein has described his conditions as “an endless toothache” and a “slow constant
peeling of the skin”;55 in a letter to a friend, he compared his situation to being intentionally buried alive.56
Claims of such devastating psychological and physical injury resulting from
prolonged solitary confinement are well known and often form the legal basis for
distinguishing solitary confinement from normal prison conditions.57 In 1997, Craig
Invades the Sphere of the Intellect and Spirit, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 647, 654 (2009) (listing several
recent high-profile inmates admitted to the federal facility in Florence, Colorado, including
9/11 conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui and Unabomber Ted Kaczynski).
47
Gertrude Strassburger, Comment, Judicial Inaction and Cruel and Unusual Punishment:
Are Super-Maximum Walls Too High for the Eighth Amendment?, 11 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS.
L. REV. 199, 203 (2001).
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Hresko, supra note 6, at 10; Angola 3: 36 Years of Solitary Confinement in the
US, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (Dec. 2006), http://www.angola3.org/uploads/A3_Booklet
_FINAL.pdf.
51
Stephen Lendman, The Angola Three: 38 Years in Prison Hell, COUNTERCURRENTS.ORG
(May 7, 2010), http://www.countercurrents.org/lendman070510.htm.
52
Chen, supra note 16.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Lobel, supra note 14, at 116.
56
Chen, supra note 16.
57
See Holly Boyer, Comment, Home Sweet Hell: An Analysis of the Eighth Amendment’s
‘Cruel and Unusual Punishment’ Clause as Applied to Supermax Prisons, 32 SW. U. L. REV.
317, 327 (2003).
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Haney and Mona Lynch published an article analyzing the psychological and social
effects of solitary confinement upon inmates.58 The authors concluded that “distinctive
patterns of negative effects have emerged clearly, consistently, and unequivocally
from . . . systematic research on solitary and punitive segregation.”59 Such symptoms
include “anxiety, panic, rage, loss of control, appetite and sleep disturbances, [and] selfmutilations . . . .”60 The authors further observed that these symptoms held firm even
when controlling for pre-existing mental disorders.61 The authors compare the condition
of inmates in solitary confinement to trauma victims and “victims of deprivation and
constraint torture techniques.”62
The end results of this extended psychological trauma have been vividly brought
to light in two recent federal court cases. While deciding Madrid v. Gomez in federal
district court in Northern California, District Court Chief Judge Henderson toured
the Security Housing Unit (SHU) at Pelican Bay State Prison to inspect the conditions of isolation which inmates had challenged for Cruel and Unusual Punishment
violations.63 Henderson noted that “some inmates spend the time simply pacing around
the edges of the pen; the image created is hauntingly similar to that of caged felines
pacing in a zoo.”64 Henderson further detailed some physical and mental characteristics of various members of the plaintiff class.65 One inmate had a “history of childhood sexual abuse, intermittent paranoia, periods of depression, and prior psychiatric
hospitalization.”66 Additionally, while in prison the same inmate suffered from hallucinations and “believed that his body had been transported . . . to a place where it
was invaded and mutilated.”67 A visiting medical doctor found another inmate “in an
acute catatonic state requiring immediate hospitalization” and found “no consistency
regarding the clinicians who saw him, nor was there adequate supportive psychotherapeutic contact . . . .”68 Indeed, many of the psychological effects reported here
are so common among isolated inmates that some experts have started labeling the
condition “SHU Syndrome.”69
58

Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Regulating Prisons of the Future: A Psychological Analysis
of Supermax and Solitary Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 477 (1997).
59
Id. at 530.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 532–33.
62
Id. at 530.
63
Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1229–32 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (finding Eighth
Amendment violations in operations of Security Housing Unit at Pelican Bay Prison only for
inmates known to have pre-existing mental illnesses).
64
Id. at 1229.
65
Id. at 1223–27.
66
Id. at 1223.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 1224.
69
See Robert M. Ferrier, Note, “An Atypical and Significant Hardship”: The Supermax
Confinement of Death Row Prisoners Based Purely on Status—A Plea for Procedural Due
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In the 1999 case of Ruiz v. Johnson,70 plaintiff-inmates enlisted the help of academic and expert witness Craig Haney in their suit against the Texas prison system
over its isolation practices.71 On his tour of solitary confinement units in the Texas
facilities, Haney described witnessing “people who had smeared themselves with
feces . . . people who had urinated in their cells . . . on the floor.”72 Haney attempted
to speak with several inmates, and generally found such conversations could be classified into a few categories. First, he noted the inmates “who were incoherent . . .
babbling, sometimes shrieking, [and another group of] . . . people who appeared to
be full of fury and anger and rage and were . . . banging their hands on the side of the
wall.”73 A final group “would be huddled in the back corner of the cell and appeared
incommunicative when [Haney] attempted to speak with them.”74 Other experts
reported “that incidents of self-mutilation and incessant babbling and shrieking were
almost daily events.”75
C. The Problem of Over-Classification
Over-classification arises when inmates are sent to a supermax prison despite not
requiring or deserving the strict regimen of solitary confinement.76 For purposes of this
Note, overclassified inmates may be found in one or both of two forms.77 First, the
inmate may be a juvenile, either at the moment he commits the sentence-triggering
offense or when he is sent to the supermax prison. Second, the inmate may have committed a relatively minor, nonviolent crime.78 Studies indicate inmates convicted of
Process, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 291, 298–99 (2004) (citing Jones’El v. Barge, 164 F. Supp. 2d
1096, 1101–02 (W.D. Wis. 2001)).
70
154 F. Supp. 2d 975 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
71
Id. at 985; see supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text (summarizing Haney and
Lynch’s 1997 article in the NYU Review of Law and Social Change).
72
Ruiz, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 985.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
See DeMaio, supra note 9, at 209.
77
Inmates sent to Supermaxes with pre-existing mental illnesses also qualify as overclassified due to their increased capacity to suffer severe trauma. Haney & Lynch, supra note
58, at 532–33. Challenges from such inmates are more likely to fall under Wilson’s two-part test,
however. This is because: 1) the attribute which triggers their Eighth Amendment review—the
mental illness—is not directly related to the gravity of their criminal offense; and 2) the decision
of prison officials to send such an inmate to a supermax facility instinctively raises the question
of deliberate indifference. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302 (1991). Therefore, this Note
will focus solely on juvenile and nonviolent offenders.
78
See generally Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 127–28 (2009). The Supreme
Court interpreted the definition of a ‘violent felony’ under the federal Armed Career Criminal
Act. Id. The statute defines a violent felony as a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a
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drug sentences constitute an ever-larger portion of our nation’s prison population, even
though drug possession and/or distribution alone do not necessarily involve violence
or coercion against another human being.79 Additionally, to be overclassified, an inmate must not have committed acts of violence or aggression while in police custody
that would give prison officials a legitimate reason to pursue stricter living conditions.80
Scholar Jerry DeMaio has observed that several characteristics of America’s
modern prison system tend to encourage over-classification.81 One factor is that the
extreme overcrowding of many lower-security facilities encourages officials to utilize
the full capacity of Supermaxes, though many state Supermaxes were originally built
to house only particularly troublesome inmates.82 Additionally, prison officials have a
related financial motive to fill Supermaxes with less-deserving inmates: a common
metric of the efficiency of prison facilities is the annual cost-per-prisoner, which improves if a facility’s operations are scaled over a larger inmate population.83 These
causes combine with the general “attractiveness of moving problem inmates” out of
lower-security facilities and into Supermaxes to create an environment in which
individuals, such as David Tracy, fall through the cracks.84
term exceeding one year” that either “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person of another,” or “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves
the use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another.” Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2006).
79
See Heather C. West & William J. Sabol, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin: Prisoners
in 2007, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, 21, tbl. 10 (Feb. 12, 2009),
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p07.pdf. Appendix Table Ten of this study shows
609,000 out of approximately 1.3 million state prisoners in 2007 were sentenced for nonviolent
crimes. Id. The authors of the study categorize violent crimes as murder, manslaughter, rape,
sexual assault, robbery, assault, and “other violent [crimes].” Id. Nonviolent crimes include
drug abuse offenses, public-order offenses, and property offenses. Id.
80
The arrest and incarceration of Pfc. Bradley Manning in connection with the leak of classified material to Wikileaks has generated renewed debate on the merits of extended solitary
confinement. See Glenn Greenwald, The Inhumane Conditions of Bradley Manning’s Detention,
SALON (Dec. 15, 2010, 1:15 PM), http://politics.salon.com/2010/12/15/manning_3/singleton/.
Though Greenwald and others make persuasive arguments against the conditions of Manning’s
incarceration, the proposal of this Note is unlikely to help Manning directly due to the seriousness of his alleged crimes. See Charlie Savage, Soldier Faces 22 New Wikileaks Charges,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/03/us/03manning.html (noting
the charges against him include “aiding the enemy” and could result in life imprisonment).
Judicial recognition of the objective classification in this Note, however, could lead to broader
changes in the legal treatment of solitary confinement which may help Manning, who has yet
to be convicted of any charge and is not considered to pose a threat to those around him. See
Greenwald supra.
81
DeMaio, supra note 9, at 209–10.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 216.
84
Id. at 222.
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The current number of overclassified inmates in supermax prisons is tough to
gauge. Out of a general United States prison population of 7.3 million in 2007,85 estimates of the current number in solitary confinement range from 60,00086 to 120,000.87
Atul Gawande, in a 2009 essay in The New Yorker, estimated 25,000 inmates reside in
supermax prisons, whereas another 50,000–80,000 are held in “restrictive segregation
units” in otherwise non-Supermax facilities.88 An official tally by the Commission
on Safety and Abuse in America’s Prisons in 2000 found 80,870 inmates in solitary
confinement;89 using different definitions, several legal scholars found fifty-seven
Supermaxes in forty states housing approximately 20,000 prisoners.90 States follow
different procedures for assigning inmates to Supermaxes, making the process of
counting the exact number of overclassified inmates nationwide very difficult.91
Some anecdotal evidence of the problem is possible, however. A 2009 investigation into the inmate population at Illinois’s Supermax facility in Tamms found sixteen inmates at the facility had been convicted of nonviolent crimes, such as car theft,
forgery, burglary and drug offenses, though these inmates committed other crimes after
incarceration.92 In 2006, the St. Petersburg Times reported on an inmate in Florida’s
prison system who was sent to solitary confinement for talking back to a guard in 1992
when he was fifteen years old and has been kept there ever since.93 The article also
found forty-seven other inmates in solitary confinement in Florida under the age of
eighteen, and noted seventy-seven percent of women and thirty-three percent of men
in solitary were diagnosed as mentally ill.94 Finally, the case of David Tracy exemplifies the terrible outcomes that may result from the problem of over-classification.95
The existence of anecdotal evidence such as this, combined with his own direct research
85

Study: 7.3 Million in U.S. Prison System in ’07, CNN JUSTICE (Mar. 2, 2009), http://articles
.cnn.com/2009-03-02/justice/record.prison.population_1_prison-system-prison-population
-corrections?_s=PM:CRIME.
86
Hresko, supra note 6, at 3.
87
Jean Casella & James Ridgway, No Evidence of National Reduction in Solitary
Confinement, SOLITARY WATCH (June 15, 2010), http://solitarywatch.com/2010/06/15/no
-evidence-of-national-reduction-in-solitary-confinement/.
88
Gawande, supra note 13.
89
See Kevin Johnson, States Start Reducing Solitary Confinement to Help Budgets, USA
TODAY (June 14, 2010, 1:56 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-06-13-solitary
-confinement-being-cut_N.htm.
90
Lobel, supra note 14, at 115 (citing Daniel P. Mears & Jamie Watson, Towards a Fair
and Balanced Assessment of Supermax Prisons, 23 JUST. Q. 232, 232–33 (2006)).
91
See Gawande, supra note 13.
92
George Pawlaczyk & Beth Hundsdorfer, Trapped in Tamms: In Illinois’ Only Supermax
Facility, Inmates Are in Cells 23 Hours a Day, BELLEVILLE NEWS-DEMOCRAT, Aug. 2, 1999,
http://www.bnd.com/2009/08/02/865377/trapped-in-tamms-in-illinois-only.html.
93
Meg Laughlin, Does Separation Equal Suffering?, THE ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 17,
2006, http://www.sptimes.com/2006/12/17/State/Does_separation_equal.shtml.
94
Id.
95
See supra Introduction.
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into the inhabitants of solitary confinement units, led Gawande to state in the same New
Yorker essay that “only a subset of prisoners currently locked away for long periods of
isolation would be considered truly dangerous.”96
II. RELEVANT PRECEDENT IN UNITED STATES AND ABROAD
Judges, scholars, and defense attorneys have dealt with solitary confinement in a
number of legal contexts.97 Subsection A describes the relatively recent advent of proportionality review, the constitutional theory from which this proposal is derived. The
rest of this Section, however, argues that past attempts—both more and less inclusive
than this proposal—have failed to help overclassified inmates. The picture painted
is one of idealistic, left-leaning advocates and defenders—pursuing sweeping arguments of facial violations of the Eighth Amendment and international laws against
torture—running into the roadblock of entrenched conservatism within the judiciary
and legislatures. By exploring these past failures, this Note hopes to make clear the
case for a Graham-style proportionality approach.
A. Cruel and Unusual Punishment: General Standards
The slow changes and gradual incorporation of nuances into the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence regarding the Eighth Amendment, especially in the proportionality line
of review, raises the hope that a challenge to solitary confinement based on culpability can succeed. The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
“cruel and unusual punishments,” but gives no further guidance to courts on what constitutes such punishments.98 Many early decisions interpreted the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause to prohibit punishments involving the cruel infliction of pain but
did not consider whether punishments were disproportionate to the crime.99 One of the
first Supreme Court cases to invalidate a sentence solely on the grounds of disproportionality was Weems v. United States100 in 1910. The Court voted to throw out a sentence of fifteen years of chained, hard labor for the crime of making a false entry in
96

Gawande, supra note 13 (“Many are escapees or suspected gang members; many others
are in solitary for nonviolent breaches of prison rules.”).
97
See Haney & Lynch, supra note 58 at 499, 539–40.
98
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. In Roper v. Simmons, the majority observed that the Court has
interpreted the Eighth Amendment through consideration of “history, tradition, and precedent,
and with due regard for its purpose and function in the constitutional design.” 543 U.S. 551, 560
(2005). Another case often cited is Trop v. Dulles, which states that the Eighth Amendment
“must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.” 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958).
99
Haney & Lynch, supra note 58, at 541 (citing Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Inflicted”: The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839 (1969)).
100
217 U.S. 349 (1910).
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a naval cash book to defraud the U.S. government of 616 Philippine pesos,101 declaring that “it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and
proportioned to [the] offense.”102
Modern Eighth Amendment jurisprudence plainly establishes proportionality
as a requirement for criminal sentences.103 In Gregg v. Georgia,104 the Court further
developed the standard for adjudicating excessive punishment claims by making two
inquiries: whether the punishment involves “unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain,” and whether the punishment is “grossly out of proportion to the severity of the
crime.”105 Several scholars have noted that the Court often determines a sentence to
be disproportionate to the offense only after a majority of states have made the same
determination, however.106
B. Graham—Classifying Proportionality Jurisprudence
In 2010, the Court extended proportionality review and analysis of categorical
restrictions in a manner easily applicable to supermax prisons. In Graham v. Florida,
the Supreme Court considered an Eighth Amendment challenge asking for a clear
line to be drawn prohibiting life-imprisonment-without-parole sentences for juvenile
offenders committing non-homicide crimes as violations of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause.107 The Supreme Court began with the observation that “cases
addressing the proportionality of sentences”—including the potential case envisioned
in this Note—“fall within two general classifications.”108 The first group of cases concerns term-of-years sentences and the Court considers “all the circumstances in a particular case,” whereas the second group concern capital punishment cases and the Court
applies a “proportionality standard by [imposing] certain categorical restrictions.”109
The Court proceeded to outline the proper judicial inquiry for cases arising under
each category.
For cases falling under the all-relevant-circumstances approach, the Court first
compares “the gravity of the offense and the severity of the sentence.”110 If this analysis
101

Id. at 357–58, 382.
Id. at 367.
103
Haney & Lynch, supra note 58, at 541; see also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284
(1983) (“The [Cruel and Unusual Punishment] clause prohibits not only barbaric punishments,
but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed.”).
104
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
105
Id. at 173.
106
See, e.g., Corinna B. Lain, The Unexceptionalism of “Evolving Standards,” 57 UCLA
L. REV. 365, 366 (2009).
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Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2018 (2010).
108
Id. at 2021.
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Id.
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Id. at 2022.
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yields “an inference of gross disproportionality,”111 the Court will conduct both intraand inter-jurisdictional analyses.112 This consists of comparing the defendant’s sentence with those of criminals convicted of different crimes in the same jurisdiction, as
well as sentences for criminals convicted of the same crime in different jurisdictions.113
The Court then vacates the sentence as unconstitutional “if this comparative analysis
‘validates [the] initial judgment that the sentence is grossly disproportionate.’”114
In Graham, the Court described the process for adjudicating categorical restriction
cases as making two inquiries: “one considering the nature of the offense, the other considering the characteristics of the offender.”115 The Court’s first step is a determination
of “whether there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue.”116
The Court uses “objective indicia,” including “legislative enactments and state practice”
in criminal sentencing, when considering the existence of any national consensus.117
A lack of national consensus as expressed in legislative enactments is insufficient to
draw any definite conclusions; the Court considers “[a]ctual sentencing practices [to
be] an important part of [its] inquiry into consensus” and, in Graham, found such a
consensus against life sentences for non-homicidal juveniles solely on this basis.118
The Court describes the next step in categorical restriction cases as an “exercise
of [the Court’s] own independent judgment whether the punishment in question violates
the Constitution.”119 This step carries great weight in the constitutional analysis; the
Court acknowledges the existence of a national consensus as an important factor but
cautions that such a fact “is not itself determinative.”120 This independent judgment
considers “the culpability of the offenders . . . the severity of the punishment,” and
“whether the challenged sentencing practice serves legitimate penological goals.”121
The Court in Graham addressed a cross-over objective classification: a “categorical
challenge to a term-of-years sentence.”122 The Court settled on the categorical restriction
approach, previously reserved for death penalty challenges, as the proper method of adjudication.123 The majority found a consensus against life sentences for non-homicidal
111

Id. (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
Id.
113
Id. (citing Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
114
Id. (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005).
115
Id. at 2022.
116
Id. (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 572).
117
Id.
118
Id. at 2023.
119
Id. at 2022 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 572).
120
Id. at 2026.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 2022 (acknowledging that the challenge in Graham brought up new issues for
the Court).
123
Id. at 2022–23. In his concurrence, Chief Justice Roberts argued the all-relevantcircumstances approach was the better method of resolving the legal question at issue. Id. At
2041 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). Roberts reached the same outcome as the majority on the
112
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juvenile offenders in actual sentencing practices, despite a nominal consensus for
the practice as judged by criminal statutes nationwide.124 Addressing culpability, the
majority found that defendants in the petitioner’s situation have a minimal amount due
to a “‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility’” common with
juveniles;125 the majority also found their offenses to be less severe than those involving the extinguishing of human life.126 Addressing sentence severity, the Graham
majority found “[l]ife without parole is an especially harsh punishment for a juvenile”
when compared to an adult offender more advanced in age.127 Finally, the Court found
no justification for the sentence based on legitimate penological goals,128 leading to the
ultimate holding that a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole is
unconstitutional for juvenile offenders convicted of non-homicidal crimes.129
C. Wilson’s Two-Part Prison Conditions Test
For a categorical test based on Graham to be implemented, overclassified inmates
must first succeed in escaping judicial analysis under the prison conditions test. In
Wilson v. Seiter130 the Supreme Court formalized a two-part test for inmates challenging the constitutionality of the conditions of their imprisonment.131 To succeed on such
an Eighth Amendment claim, inmates must pass both an objective test of a sufficiently
serious deprivation of a life necessity, and a subjective test of deliberate indifference on
the part of prison officials.132 The Court emphasized the importance of making this standard difficult to meet, declaring that “[n]othing so amorphous as ‘overall conditions’
immediate sentence of the plaintiff, but did not support any categorical rules. Id. at 2036
(Roberts, C.J., concurring).
124
Id. at 2023 (“Although these statutory schemes contain no explicit prohibition on
sentences of life without parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders, those sentences are
most infrequent.”).
125
Id. at 2026 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70).
126
Id.
127
Id. at 2028.
128
Id. (reading past precedents as observing four purposes for criminal punishment:
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation).
129
Id. at 2033. The Court found confirmation for this holding in its observation that no
other country besides Israel actually imposes such a sentence for non-homicidal juvenile
offenders, though the majority was quick to note: “This observation does not control our
decision.” Id. Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence reached the same result but applied the
usual, non-categorical method of inquiry for term-of-years challenges. Id. at 2036 (Roberts,
C.J., concurring). Justice Thomas’s dissent challenged the majority regarding their claims of
the existence of both a national consensus against the sentencing practice and an inference
of gross disproportionality when considered in light of the petitioner’s crime. Id. at 2043–46
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
130
501 U.S. 294 (1991).
131
Id. at 296.
132
Id. at 298, 302.
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can rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment when no specific deprivation of
a single human need exists.”133
Several scholars have persuasively argued that the Wilson standard is an excessively high standard for inmates to meet.134 Especially problematic for inmates is establishing the subjective standard of deliberate indifference, which requires plaintiffs to
prove prison officials entertained a state of mind equivalent to “criminal recklessness”
before their Eighth Amendment claim can move forward.135 One author has attributed
this judicial deference to a reluctance to second-guess the decisions of prison administrators “on the ground,” especially when such administrators make strident arguments
that certain procedures are necessary for security.136 Overclassified inmates are not
completely without hope, however; Wilson and its two-part test can be distinguished
from the proposed Supermax-proportionality claim on the grounds that the sentence
at issue in Wilson was “not . . . the penalty formally imposed for a crime.”137
D. Other Potential Legal Avenues for Supermax Inmates
1. Permanent vs. Temporary Solitary Confinement
The importance and necessity of a Supermax-proportionality claim becomes all
the more clear upon analyzing the myriad of other approaches that scholars, litigators,
and inmates have attempted without success. One scholar speculates that courts may
treat permanent assignments to solitary confinement in a different manner than previous Eighth Amendment claims.138 Jules Lobel finds two recent Supreme Court cases
involving prison conditions and the Eighth Amendment in which the Court ruled on
behalf of prison officials, but only on the narrow basis that the specific restrictions in
question were of a limited duration.139 In both opinions the Court noted that a permanent restriction may change the analysis.140 Lobel extrapolates from these cases the
notion that “to confine someone in such isolation for the rest of his or her life . . . seems
133

Id. at 305.
See, e.g., Haney & Lynch, supra note 58, at 551; Vasiliades, supra note 6, at 95.
135
Haney & Lynch, supra note 58, at 551.
136
Strassburger, supra note 47, at 216.
137
Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302.
138
Lobel, supra note 14, at 120 (“Several recent Supreme Court decisions suggest that
claims by prisoners confined in a supermax permanently ought to be accorded different Eighth
Amendment scrutiny.”).
139
Id. at 120 n.28 (citing Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 134 (2003)); see also Beard
v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 536 (2006).
140
Beard, 548 U.S. at 536 (affirming Pennsylvania’s ban on newspapers, magazines, and
personal reading materials for inmates placed in the state’s long-term segregation unit, reserved
for inmates repeatedly displaying dangerous behavior); Overton, 539 U.S. at 136–37 (affirming
Michigan’s two-year visitation ban for inmates convicted of narcotics offenses).
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extreme—akin to a death sentence for life.”141 She believes that a punishment of this
nature “ought to be recognized as violative of the Eighth Amendment.”142
Although Lobel’s argument is persuasive, it runs into the judicial roadblock emanating from the death penalty, as argued in this Note.143 As long as the Supreme Court
upholds the death penalty as consistent with the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause,
permanent placement in a supermax prison will be seen as less harsh by comparison.144
Moreover, many inmates placed permanently in a supermax facility committed serious
crimes before their admission to prison, with some proceeding to commit additional
crimes while incarcerated.145 Rather than arguing that solitary confinement should be
categorically barred for all inmates, this Note aims to propose a realistic legal avenue
to bring relief to the most deserving inmates—those sent to supermax prisons due to
over-classification without a history of violent crimes.
2. Focus on a Single Aspect of Life in Solitary Confinement
Another strategy focuses on a single restriction inmates face as part of their solitary
confinement routine, rather than challenging their placement in isolation generally.
In the Seventh Circuit case Davenport v. DeRobertis,146 a class of isolated prisoners
sued Illinois correctional officials on the grounds that the prison’s practice of restricting
inmates to only one hour of out-of-cell exercise and one shower per week violated the
Eighth Amendment.147 Regarding the limit on out-of-cell exercise, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower court’s ruling that only one hour “is too little,” observing that, combined with other activities, the inmates were forced to spend “165 out of 168 hours [a
week] in a 90-square-foot cage.”148 The court reversed the ruling requiring at least three
showers a week, however, writing that “many millions of Americans take fewer than
three showers (or baths) a week without endangering their physical or mental health.”149
In Thomas v. Ramos,150 the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court’s finding of summary judgment for prison officials on an inmate suit challenging the practice of allowing only two hours of outdoor exercise.151 The Circuit Court distinguished Davenport
141

Lobel, supra note 14, at 122.
Id.
143
See supra Introduction.
144
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (noting that the death penalty “is
different in kind from any other punishment. . . .”).
145
See Chen, supra note 16 (detailing the extensive criminal record of long-term supermax
prison resident Tommy Silverstein).
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844 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1988).
147
Id. at 1312.
148
Id. at 1314.
149
Id. at 1316. The court also noted that “the record shows . . . that isolating a human
being from other human beings . . . month after month can cause substantial psychological
damage.” Id. at 1313.
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130 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 1997).
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Id. at 762, 765.
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on the grounds that the inmates in Davenport were held in solitary for much longer
periods of time, whereas the inmate in Thomas had a cellmate and thus was not completely isolated. Further, the inmate in Thomas sought outdoor exercise whereas the
inmates in Davenport sought only out-of-cell exercise.152
As these two Seventh Circuit decisions illustrate, inmates narrowing their challenge
to only one aspect of their solitary confinement have had some success in ameliorating
the worst-of-the-worst conditions. Judges continue to exhibit substantial deference to
prison officials in their rulings, however, and often find numerous ways to distinguish
past precedent, which appears to support the immediate inmate challenge.153 This narrow strategy should be considered a useful tool in specific situations, but it cannot be
relied upon to bring overall relief to overclassified inmates.154
E. Recent Direct Eighth Amendment Challenges to Supermax Prisons
1. Madrid v. Gomez
Two recent federal court challenges to supermax practices have continued to
employ the Wilson standard, yet both exhibit more recognition of the terrible conditions inmates face in isolation. In Madrid v. Gomez, Chief Judge Henderson of the
Northern District of California conducted an extremely thorough investigation, review,
and analysis of the solitary Security Housing Unit (SHU) of California’s Supermax
prison, Pelican Bay State Prison.155 Plaintiffs constituted the entire class of prisoners
152

Id. at 763.
See, e.g., id. (distinguishing an inmate housed in segregation for seventy days from
successful class-action plaintiffs who all served more than ninety days in segregation).
154
Another potential legal avenue for overclassified inmates is found in the protections
of the Due Process Clause. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). In Wilkinson v. Austin,
the Supreme Court held for the first time that inmates had a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in avoiding transfer from a lesser-security prison facility to a supermax, and thus state
transfer policies had to meet standards of Due Process. 545 U.S. 209, 218–24 (2005). Further,
one author has argued for greater Due Process protections for death-row prisoners assigned to
solitary confinement while awaiting their execution date, with judges conducting more thorough
hearings on whether a supermax assignment is proper for inmates with mental illness. Ferrier,
supra note 69, at 293–94, 315. Though Due Process is a valuable protection against arbitrary
and possibly indefinite assignment to supermax facilities, judges accord deference to the state
in such challenges and thus provide only minimal help to overclassified inmates. See Wilkinson,
545 U.S. at 230; Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 547 (1979)) (declaring “‘[p]rison administrators . . . should be accorded wide-ranging
deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices . . . .’”).
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889 F. Supp. 1146, 1146 (1995). Pelican Bay State Prison is located 363 miles north of
San Francisco. Id. at 1155; see also Haney & Lynch, supra note 58, at 557.
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assigned to the SHU, a separate facility within Pelican Bay.156 Inmates in the SHU were
confined in cells without windows for approximately twenty-two-and-a-half hours a
day.157 The inmates challenged the overall conditions at SHU on Eighth Amendment
grounds, putting forth the argument that conditions in the solitary confinement cells
were “inhumane,” along with other claims, including excessive force from prison
guards, lack of adequate access to courts, and lack of adequate access to medical and
mental health care.158
Applying Wilson, the judge found for the inmates on two of their claims;159 ultimately, however, the plaintiffs lost on their primary claim of overall conditions constituting cruel and unusual punishment.160 The judge noted inmates were typically
assigned to the SHU because of behavior violations, gang affiliations, or “general
concerns regarding assaultive or disruptive behavior,” though officials acknowledged
placing a few inmates in the SHU for their own protection against assault from other
prisoners.161 Regarding a deprivation of life necessity and wanton infliction of pain
standard, the judge drew a line separating SHU inmates with previous incidences of
mental illness from those without such a history. The court ruled that conditions did not
create a risk of psychological injury of “sufficiently serious magnitude” for all inmates
in the SHU, but did find such an Eighth Amendment violation for inmates “at a particularly high risk for suffering very serious . . . injury to their mental health . . . .”162
Scholarly reaction to the Madrid opinion was mixed. Haney and Lynch praised
the court for the consolidation of prisoner complaints and an “unusually sophisticated psychological analysis of an especially elaborate factual record,” but believed
the court should have found constitutional violations on behalf of all inmates housed
in the SHU.163 Haney and Lynch noted that the two-part conditions test forced the judge
“to articulate a standard of psychological harm that will be very difficult for future
plaintiffs to meet.”164 Other scholars have made similar observations, praising the court
for its broad analysis and emphasis on mental illnesses but arguing the standard for
finding a constitutional violation is too high.165 Nonetheless, the court applied the high
standard from Wilson faithfully, illustrating the need for a different legal strategy for
overclassified supermax inmates.166
156

Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1155.
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2. Ruiz v. Johnson
In Ruiz v. Johnson, a class of inmates in the general population of the Texas
correctional system brought an Eighth Amendment claim, similar to the plaintiffs’
action in Madrid, against prison officials.167 The district court applied Wilson’s twopart prison conditions test and found that both the overall conditions of the segregated
units, as well as the practice of placing mentally ill prisoners in solitary confinement,
violated the Eighth Amendment.168 The court held the “extreme social isolation and
reduced environmental stimulation” constituted a deprivation of a basic human need,
and prison officials showed deliberate indifference through their placement of mentally ill inmates in solitary confinement for long periods of time.169 The court held that
prison conditions violated “‘evolving standards of decency that mark progress of a
maturing society.’”170 The court ended its opinion with the conclusion that “[n]ew
relief must . . . be fashioned to correct the continuing violations of the plaintiffs’
constitutional rights.”171
Ruiz represents a rare success for isolated inmates challenging the conditions
of their imprisonment. The inmates were able to elicit a finding of ongoing Eighth
Amendment violations, even though the court employed the difficult prison conditions
test of Wilson.172 Ruiz may be an outlier, however, given the extremely severe conditions in the Texas prison system as described above.173 The court also found Eighth
Amendment violations in prison officials’ failure to protect inmate safety and in excessive use of force by prison guards; such findings may have contributed to the court’s
holding on solitary confinement.174 As this Note argues, overclassified inmates in solitary confinement should not have to experience conditions akin to those in Ruiz before
they can obtain relief from the courts.
F. International and Foreign Treatment of Solitary Confinement
International and foreign law regarding this topic is important for three main reasons. First, the Supreme Court has stated international and foreign legal practices have
potential relevance in modern interpretations of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
167

154 F. Supp. 975, 980–81 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (citing Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265
(S.D. Tex. 1980)).
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Id. at 985–86 (“Based on all the evidence, it was found that current and ongoing Eighth
Amendment violations had been established as to the conditions of confinement in administrative segregation . . . and regarding the practice of using administrative segregation to house
mentally ill prisoners.”).
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Id. at 986.
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Id. (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981)).
171
Id. at 1001.
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Id. at 985–86.
173
See id. at 983–88; supra Part I.B.
174
Ruiz, 154 F. Supp. at 986–87.

236

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:217

Clause.175 In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court gave international and foreign
laws a non-determinative yet confirmatory nod when it prohibited the imposition of
the death sentence for crimes committed while the defendant was under the age of
eighteen.176 Second, several European countries have taken stronger legal stands
against solitary confinement, and scholar Tracy Hresko has identified three international treaties and declarations, which the United States has recognized, that all contain potential ramifications relating to supermax prisons.177 Finally, several scholars
have made international law the basis of their proposals to alleviate the plight of isolated prisoners.178 Delving into recent applications of international laws and European
legal decisions, however, one finds the international legal opinion regarding solitary
confinement and supermax prisons to be relatively muddled. This Section argues that
a more robust application of international criminal law norms to domestic solitary
confinement practices is not the panacea supermax critics may have hoped it to be.
1. International Laws and Treaties
On December 10, 1948, the UN General Assembly adopted the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)—not as a binding treaty, but rather as a set
of legal norms towards which member countries should strive.179 Article Five of the
document states that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”180 Hresko observes that several U.S. courts have
considered the Declaration in the process of interpreting domestic laws;181 additionally,
in 2004, the Supreme Court noted the domestic legal significance of the Declaration,
as well as its “substantial indirect effect on international law.”182 United States courts
have not, as of yet, interpreted Article Five of the Declaration to affect supermax prison
practices, however, and the close resemblance between the language of the UDHR and
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause makes it questionable whether such a ruling
would have any marginal impact.183
175

See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (“The opinion of the world community,
while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for our
own conclusions.”).
176
Id. at 575.
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Hresko, supra note 6, at 17–19.
178
See, e.g., id. (discussing possible violations of international laws against torture);
Vasiliades, supra note 6, at 72–73 (discussing possible violations of international standards
regarding treatment of prisoners).
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III)
(Dec. 10, 1948); see Hresko, supra note 6, at 17–18.
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 179, at art. 5.
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Hresko, supra note 6, at 18 (citing Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382,
1388 (10th Cir. 1981); Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 147 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)).
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Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 735 n.23 (2004).
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Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, with Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra
note 179, at art. 5.
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Also potentially applicable to supermax prisons, Hresko cites the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the United Nations adopted on
December 19, 1966.184 Though the Covenant entered into force on March 23, 1976
and President Jimmy Carter signed the document in 1977 on behalf of the United
States, the Senate did not officially ratify the Covenant until 1992.185 Upon ratification, the Senate attached five reservations to the international treaty, including one to
Article Seven.186 Article Seven closely resembles the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, stating, “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.”187 One Senate reservation declared that Article Seven binds
the United States only to the extent that “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment” tracks the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause as interpreted in U.S.
courts.188 Additionally, the Senate labeled the treaty as non-self-executing, an action
United States courts subsequently interpreted as removing any binding authority from
the agreement.189
Even if the treaty were to gain binding authority in the United States, it is uncertain whether common solitary confinement practices would be affected. In 1992 the
Human Rights Committee issued a general comment to Article Seven for the purpose
of providing further clarification on the definition of torture under the treaty.190 General
Comment Twenty states only that “prolonged solitary confinement of the detained
or imprisoned person may amount to acts prohibited by article 7.”191 The Comment
further states that Article Seven refers to acts causing “mental suffering” as well as
the physical infliction of pain.192 Such statements may be interpreted as indicating
that the Committee will keep an eye on the solitary confinement practices of member
countries, but such practices must be more extreme than usual to violate the standards
of Article Seven.
The last source of international law Hresko cites is the Convention Against Torture,
which the United Nations General Assembly adopted on December 10, 1984 and
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entered into force on June 26, 1987.193 The United States signed the treaty in April
1988 and the Senate followed with ratification in 1994.194 The Convention establishes a Committee Against Torture to enforce the treaty,195 which defines torture as:
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes
as . . . punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed . . . when such pain or suffering is inflicted by . . . or with
the consent . . . of a public official.196
Article One also states, however, that torture “does not include pain or suffering
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.”197 The potential impact the Convention may have on United States supermax practices is therefore likely
to be minimal, as current United States laws generally allow for prolonged solitary
confinement.198
The international declarations and treaties discussed above are likely not instruments capable of bringing full relief to overclassified inmates in supermax facilities.
Each document either lacks binding force in the United States, provides exceptions
for lawfully sanctioned punishments, or is ambiguous at best as to whether its definition of torture pertains to solitary confinement. Thus scholars should look elsewhere
for law sufficiently robust to bring about relief to inmates undeservedly languishing
in prolonged isolation.
2. European Judicial Treatment of Solitary Confinement
European legal bodies have dealt with solitary confinement on occasion, including
a European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) action to delay the extradition of suspected
193

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51
(1984), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (June 26, 1987) [hereinafter Convention Against Torture]; Hresko,
supra note 6, at 18.
194
See Hresko, supra note 6, at 18–19.
195
Convention Against Torture, supra note 193, at art. 17.
196
Id. at art. 1(I).
197
Id.
198
See Starr, supra note 13; see, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 213, 229 (2005)
(noting the large increase in supermax facilities in the US between 1985–2005 and refusing
to make any holding regarding the practice under the Eighth Amendment). In 2008, the
Committee against Torture issued a report on the Philippines’s prison practices. U.N. Comm.
Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 19 of
the Convention: Philippines, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/PHL/2 (Sept. 9, 2008). The report cited, with
approval, a bill pending in the Philippines’s legislature which outlawed and defined mental
torture as including solitary confinement of prisoners “in public places,” “against their will
or without prejudice to their security.” Id. at art. 1.
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terrorists to the United States due to concerns over a possible lengthy sentence in a
federal supermax in Colorado.199 The ECHR enforces the European Convention on
Human Rights (European Convention),200 of which Article Three prohibits “torture
or . . . inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”201 Similar to the application
of international criminal law treaties to prolonged isolation,202 the ECHR’s treatment
of solitary confinement cases under Article Three is mixed.203
One scholar has praised the European Court, however, for providing more specifics
than the United States Supreme Court on what constitutes legal solitary confinement
techniques.204 In a 2005 case, the ECHR identified “complete sensory isolation coupled
with total social isolation” as the elements of some solitary confinement practices that
constitute inhumane treatment.205 Mere “prohibition of contact with other prisoners for
security, disciplinary or protective reasons,” on the other hand, is not per se inhuman
or degrading treatment and thus does not incur the intervention of the ECHR.206 For
example, in 2006 the ECHR rejected an appeal from Ilich Ramirez-Sanchez, a.k.a.
“Carlos the Jackal,” ruling his assignment to solitary confinement for eight years did
not constitute “inhumane treatment.”207 The ECHR held that his long period of solitary confinement—instituted because of his nature as a dangerous flight risk with the
potential to disrupt order in the prison—did not violate any of his human rights.208
The case of Ramirez-Sanchez above illustrates that the ECHR does not consider
the length of an inmate’s detention in solitary confinement as determinative, but rather
weighs the length of isolation against the reasons for the detention.209 Further, the
ECHR gives strong consideration to the conditions of the inmate’s solitary confinement in its analysis; in Ramirez-Sanchez’s case, greater amounts of access to exercise,
199

See Dominic Casciani, Abu Hamza US Extradition Halted, BBC NEWS (July 8, 2010),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10551784.
200
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, art. 19, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 234.
201
Id. at art. 3.
202
See supra Part II.F.1 (discussing the applicability of prominent international human
rights treaties to U.S. solitary confinement practices).
203
See generally Execution Judgment Ramirez Sanchez v. France, EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS NEWS (Jan. 1, 2011), http://echrnews.wordpress.com/2011/01/01/ramirez/
(observing the ECHR may take two-and-a-half years to adjudicate appeals of improper solitary
confinement).
204
Vasiliades, supra note 6, at 92–93 (stating the ECHR has “outlined specific instances
of legitimate segregation techniques . . . which cumulatively represent significant strides ahead
of U.S. jurisprudence”).
205
Ocalan v. Turkey, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶191.
206
Id.
207
Ramirez-Sanchez v. France, 2006-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶86; see also Jan Sliva, Human
Rights Court Dismisses Carlos the Jackal’s Appeal Over Solitary Confinement, THE SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, July 4, 2006, http://legacy.signonsandiego.com/news/world/20060704
-0808-carlosthejackal.html.
208
Ramirez-Sanchez, 2006-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶¶60, 62, 150.
209
Id. at ¶150.
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reading materials, and sensory stimulation likely weighed against his arguments on
appeal.210 Therefore, though the ECHR is similar to United States courts in holding
prolonged solitary confinement does not generally constitute cruel and unusual punishment or torture, the European Court conducts a more nuanced analysis of the conditions of the inmate’s confinement.211 This Note hopes to achieve a similarly nuanced
treatment of supermax prisons in U.S. courts but on the basis of the characteristics of
isolated inmates.
III. A NEW APPROACH—GRAHAM-STYLE CATEGORICAL RESTRICTION
A. The Case for Different Standards for Overclassified Inmates
Part II above chronicled past efforts of inmates to have their detentions in solitary
confinement and supermax prisons deemed cruel and unusual punishment.212 The main
obstacle for many Eighth Amendment challenges to supermax facilities is the two-part
prison conditions test the Supreme Court established in Wilson v. Seiter, which requires
inmates to prove both an objective deprivation of a basic human need and a subjective
mindset of deliberate indifference on the part of prison officials.213 The targets of this
Note—overclassified inmates detained in supermax facilities—are generally treated
identically to more violent inmates once inside a supermax facility.214 These juvenile
and nonviolent offenders have significantly less culpability for their conduct, however,
and, accordingly, their claims for relief from supermax conditions should be adjudicated under different standards than those laid out in Wilson.215
Overclassified inmates do not carry the same levels of culpability and threat to
prison safety as older criminals with a history of committing violent felonies, which
justifies their isolation in the eyes of those on the political Right.216 At least in the case
of juveniles, such prisoners are less likely to be hardened into their criminal lifestyle
and thus present a greater opportunity for rehabilitation.217 As the cases and descriptions
of supermax facilities above indicate, conditions in prolonged solitary confinement
210

Id. at ¶¶127–28, 135–36.
See Starr, supra note 13 (“In general, an international law theory based on ‘cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment’ might be an easier sell—it’s similar to torture, but less aggravated, and
is also prohibited by international law.”).
212
See supra Part II.
213
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 303 (1991).
214
See Herrera v. Williams, 99 F. App’x. 188, 189–90 (2004).
215
See DeMaio, supra note 9, at 218–22 (discussing the concerns inherent in overclassification).
216
See generally Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010); DeMaio, supra note
9, at 209.
217
See generally Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026–27. The Court noted juvenile offenders are less
culpable than adults due to a “lack of maturity and an undeveloped sense of responsibility,” and
further drew a line distinguishing the culpability of criminals intending to extinguish human
life from other offenders. Id. (citations omitted).
211
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units can be extremely traumatic and present little chance for inmates to mend their
lifestyles.218 Therefore, a categorical restriction can be a vital safeguard in preventing
overclassified inmates from ever entering a supermax facility, further ensuring such
prisons remain the destination of solely the “worst of the worst.”219
B. The Categorical Restriction Challenge
The exact shape and language constituting the desired categorical restriction may
depend on the facts of the case giving rise to the challenge, but generally the proposed
rule should shadow the majority’s holding in Graham.220 In a hypothetical case, an
inmate assigned to a supermax facility files an Eighth Amendment challenge to his
sentence, petitioning the court to declare his prolonged solitary confinement cruel and
unusual punishment for an offender either below the age of eighteen, sentenced for
a crime committed while below the age of eighteen, and/or sentenced for a relatively
minor, nonviolent crime. This challenge would be both a natural and significant extension of Graham: the proposal asks for a categorical restriction relating to a term-ofyears sentence, but focuses on the location of imprisonment instead of the length of
imprisonment alone.221 This Subsection describes each step in the Eighth Amendment
analysis of the Graham majority, accompanied by a corresponding analysis of overclassification and solitary confinement.
Justice Kennedy delineated the procedure a court follows upon being presented
with a request for a categorical restriction in his majority opinion in Graham.222
First, a court considers “‘objective indicia of society’s standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice.’”223 Kennedy analyzed the number of state
statutes prescribing the sentencing practice at issue in Graham—life-without-parole
for juvenile non-homicide offenders—and found a substantial majority permitted the
practice.224 Justice Kennedy did not find this analysis sufficiently thorough, however, and continued to examine actual sentencing practices regarding juvenile nonhomicide offenders.225
218

See supra Part II.E (describing conditions in Pelican Bay and Texas’s Supermax facility).
DeMaio, supra note 9, at 222 (quoting former Wisconsin Governor Tommy Thompson
in his description of the purpose of the state’s supermax prison facility).
220
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030 (holding “those who were below [the age of 18] when the
offense was committed may not be sentenced to life without parole for a nonhomicide crime”).
221
Id. As noted previously, Graham itself was both a natural extension and significant
departure from previous Eighth Amendment proportionality precedents. See supra Part II.B.
222
See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022–23.
223
Id. at 2022 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005)).
224
Id. at 2023 (observing thirty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and federal law
allowed life-without-parole sentences for juvenile non-homicide offenders).
225
Id. Referring to Florida’s proposition that a substantial majority of states permitting the
sentencing practice alone demonstrates a favorable national consensus, Justice Kennedy
responded that their “argument is incomplete and unavailing” and further noted that “[a]ctual
sentencing practices are an important part of the Court’s inquiry into consensus.” Id.
219
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The Court in Graham found 123 juvenile, non-homicide offenders serving lifewithout-parole sentences in only eleven states nationwide, and observed that this data
indicated “how rare these sentences are.”226 Although a comprehensive study has yet
to be conducted on the number of juvenile and/or nonviolent offenders in supermax
prisons, the more limited studies cited above provide evidence indicating the numbers
may be similar to those found in Graham.227 One study identified fifty-seven supermax
facilities in the nation holding approximately 20,000 prisoners.228 From that number,
several journalists have identified small numbers of overclassified inmates in specific
facilities. Journalists identified sixteen nonviolent offenders at the Tamms Supermax
facility in Illinois in 2009,229 and a Florida journalist discovered forty-seven juvenile
inmates in solitary confinement in that state’s prison system in 2006.230 Though admittedly only anecdotal, such investigations are evidence that the ultimate number of
overclassified inmates is significant enough to be an issue, but low enough to aid a
court in finding a national consensus against the practice.
As Justice Kennedy noted, however, such a finding of national consensus “is not
itself determinative of whether a punishment is cruel and unusual”—the court must
exercise its own “independent judgment.”231 Kennedy described this step as considering “the culpability of the offenders . . . in light of their crimes and characteristics,
along with the severity of . . . punishment,” as well as “whether the challenged sentencing practice serves legitimate penological goals.”232 The majority found reduced
culpability for both juveniles relative to adults and offenders committing non-homicide
crimes relative to homicide offenders.233 The Court further ruled life-without-parole
to be “‘the second most severe penalty permitted by law’”234 and “an especially harsh
punishment for a juvenile” relative to an older offender.235 The Court concluded the
independent judgment phase of inquiry with the finding that the sentencing practice
in Graham served none of the recognized goals of the penal system.236
226

Id. at 2024. Kennedy further observed that 77 of the 123 inmates—“a significant
majority”—are imprisoned in Florida. Id.
227
See supra Part I.C (summarizing recent anecdotal evidence on the number of juvenile,
nonviolent offenders imprisoned in supermax facilities).
228
Lobel, supra note 14, at 115 (citing Daniel P. Mears & Jamie Watson, Towards a Fair
and Balanced Assessment of Supermax Prisons, 23 JUST. Q. 232, 232–33 (2006)).
229
Pawlaczyk & Hundsdorfer, supra note 92.
230
Laughlin, supra note 93.
231
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.
232
Id. (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568, 571–72, 575 (2005); Solem v. Helm, 463
U.S. 277, 292 (1983)). Kennedy lists retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation
as the four “legitimate penological goals.” Id. at 2026, 2028–29.
233
Id. at 2026–27.
234
Id. at 2027 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991)).
235
Id. at 2028.
236
Id. at 2030 (“In sum, penological theory is not adequate to justify life without parole for
juvenile nonhomicide offenders.”).
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An exercise of the Court’s independent judgment should lead to similar conclusions when the sentencing practice is juvenile and/or nonviolent offenders assigned
to supermax prisons. Inmates in either category of over-classification are far from the
worst of the worst that prison officials originally target with Supermaxes; to paraphrase the Court, such inmates have “twice diminished moral culpability”237 relative
to more mature offenders committing violent crimes.238 The Court observed in Roper
that juvenile crimes rarely “reflect[ ] irreparable corruption,”239 and the commission of
such crimes is more likely the result of external pressures and a lack of maturity.240
The Court’s comparison of homicide with non-homicide crimes is easily transmitted
to the comparison of violent crimes with nonviolent crimes, including property and
drug offenses; an identical result of less culpability for the latter is self-evident.241
The Court recognizes four penological goals in Graham: retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation.242 The Court perceives retribution as justifying a sentence only if it is “‘directly related to the personal culpability of the . . . offender’”;243
thus, the retribution justification must be based on the culpability analysis conducted
above. For juvenile and/or nonviolent offenders with relatively low culpability, an
assignment to a small, solitary cell for twenty-three hours a day without external stimuli goes well beyond what the goal of retribution would suggest.244
Both goals of deterrence and incapacitation also require an adequate level of culpability to be justified as legitimate penological goals for a sentence,245 and in this case
neither serves to sufficiently support assignment to supermax facilities for an overclassified inmate. The possibility of an assignment to a supermax facility is too low
and too dependent on the actions of prison officials after court sentencing to deter an
individual’s decision to commit a crime. This is especially true if the crime is relatively minor and nonviolent; such offenders have little reason to believe they will be
sent to a facility that politicians describe as housing the “worst of the worst.”246 The
marginal increase in incapacitation from a lower-security prison to a supermax consists
237

Id. at 2027.
See id.
239
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005).
240
Id. at 569–70.
241
See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027.
242
Id. at 2028.
243
Id. (quoting Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987)).
244
Meghan J. Ryan, Judging Cruelty, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 81, 101–03, 105, 113 (2010)
(discussing the goals of retribution and lack of culpability for juvenile offenders).
245
See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028–29. The Court quoted Roper as observing, “The same
characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest . . . that juveniles will
be less susceptible to deterrence.” Id. at 2028 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 571). The Court in
Graham additionally quoted Roper regarding the impact a juvenile’s “transient immaturity”
has on an incapacitation analysis for a given sentencing practice. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029
(quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 572).
246
See DeMaio, supra note 9, at 222.
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only of increased protection against prisoner escape and crimes committed in prison;
an offender is kept away from the public equally in each type of facility. Thus, unless
the overclassified inmate is a danger to the safety of the specific prison facility—thus
removing his status as overclassified—incapacitation does not justify assignment to
a supermax.
The final recognized penological justification is rehabilitation, and in this regard
the failure of Supermaxes is greatest. Paraphrasing the Court in Graham, assignment
to a supermax “forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal.”247 As mentioned above,
the Quakers of the early nineteenth century initially believed solitary confinement
would produce improved rehabilitative results but quickly learned otherwise.248 The
research of Haney and Lynch, also cited above, details the long list of negative psychological effects an inmate experiences in prolonged isolation without any external
stimuli.249 Such psychological injuries may be greater if imposed on juvenile offenders,
a group the Supreme Court acknowledges “are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures.”250 Rehabilitation, therefore, cannot be plausibly
claimed as a justification for the assignment of anyone to a supermax facility.
A court conducting this analysis is likely to conclude that a prolonged assignment
to a supermax for an overclassified inmate violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause as grossly disproportionate to the crime. Following the path the Supreme Court
cleared in Graham, a judge should that find this punishment is commonly rejected in
actual sentencing practices and is disproportionately severe as to the culpability of the
offenders. Additionally, the punishment finds no legitimate justification from recognized penological goals, and thus an assignment to a supermax for an overclassified
inmate is not in accordance with the Eighth Amendment.
C. The Remedy
Despite finding for juvenile offenders on the legal question, the Court in Graham
did not require Florida to immediately release all juvenile offenders serving lifewithout-parole sentences, nor did it demand that the state reduce all such sentences to
a limited term of years.251 Rather, the Graham majority required Florida and other states
to provide such offenders with “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based
on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”252 The Court further noted that “[i]t is for
the State, in the first instance, to explore the means and mechanisms for compliance.”253
247

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030.
See supra Part I.A; see also Lobel, supra note 14, at 118. Lobel quotes from Alexis de
Tocqueville as stating the practice of solitary confinement “does not reform, it kills.” Id.
249
Haney & Lynch, supra note 58, at 530.
250
Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
251
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030 (“A State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to
a juvenile offender convicted of a non-homicide crime.”).
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Id.
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Id.
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Similarly, courts should not require states and the federal government to immediately release all overclassified inmates from prison or guarantee they will never enter
a supermax institution. Such a ruling falls on the other extreme and removes too much
discretion from prison administrators, possibly signaling to juvenile and nonviolent
inmates that they cannot be punished for bad prison behavior. Rather, jurisdictions
should configure procedures that would bar an overclassified inmate from entering a
supermax as long as he remains overclassified. Under this proposal, nonviolent and/or
juvenile offenders could not be transferred to a supermax prison unless they commit
an act in prison which removes this classification. In addition to preventing the imposition of a cruel and unusual punishment, this rule would provide an incentive for such
offenders to behave well and not become the hardened criminals for which supermax
prisons are designed. Moreover, officials should move with reasonable speed to transfer all currently overclassified inmates to less-restrictive facilities proportional to their
threat level and culpability.
Proper procedures for entry and release into a supermax facility can act as a safeguard against potential Eighth Amendment violations,254 and courts should delineate
a baseline standard for incarceration officials to follow when adjusting their penal
systems. First, a jurisdiction’s prison assignment system should ensure that no juvenile or nonviolent convict is sent to a supermax prison at the start of his sentence. This
outcome flatly and directly violates the categorical restriction on assignment of overclassified inmates to Supermaxes and provides these inmates with no opportunity for
rehabilitation. Second, prison regulations should devise alternative disciplinary measures for this class of inmates to correct misbehavior that does not cross the line into
violence or the threat thereof. A transfer to a supermax for a minor infraction is excessive because supermax assignments tend to last for an extended time period.255
Finally, courts should prevent jurisdictions from narrowing their definition of an
overclassified inmate too far, as a robust standard helps to limit Supermaxes to their
proper function as home for solely the worst of the worst. The definition of juvenile
offenders is fairly straightforward—such an inmate is overclassified if his sentence is
for a crime he committed under the age of eighteen. A similarly clear definition of violent crime is not as easy to obtain, however, and therefore courts should allow legislatures and corrections officials some discretion in devising standards, which may vary
254

See DeMaio, supra note 9, at 222 (observing “these ‘gatekeeper’ functions—the substantive and procedural requirements for admission to and release from [a supermax]—are
the logical place to begin” when preventing over-classification of inmates). See generally
Institutions by Security Levels, VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (2010), http://www
.vadoc.state.va.us/facilities/security-levels.shtm (detailing Virginia’s separation of prison facilities into categories representing levels of security with corresponding standards of entry into
each category).
255
See DeMaio, supra note 9, at 236 (noting Wisconsin’s Supermax prison has “an intended
total length of stay from twenty-four to thirty-six months”); Institutions by Security Levels,
supra note 254 (noting assignment to Virginia’s Supermax facility is “long-term”).
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across state lines. If states press the issue too far, courts can fall back on federal statutes
and agency regulations as guidelines, including the definition of violent felony in the
federal Armed Career Criminal Act, as well as the Department of Justice’s Bureau of
Justice Statistics definition of violent offenses.256
D. Practical Impact of Categorical Restriction and Remedy
Implementation of this proposal is likely to generate two areas of concern for
prison administrators: cost and prison safety. First, prison officials are likely to point
to the large investments states make in building and operating supermax facilities.257
A court ruling preventing the assignment of large classes of inmates to the facilities
on constitutional grounds may lead to lower utilization and generate less return on the
facilities for states. States may have to construct additional disciplinary housing units
at lower-security prisons to accommodate inmates with relatively minor behavioral
infractions. Prison officials may also argue that removing any options from their arsenal
of disciplinary methods will hamper their ability to punish misbehavior effectively and
embolden problem inmates. Finally, staff at supermax facilities often have special training to work with problem inmates,258 and housing more inmates with even small behavior issues in lower-security facilities may pose threats to the safety of staff and other
inmates. This Subsection describes how the categorical restriction proposal adequately
accounts for all of these concerns.
1. Cost Concerns
Under the proposed categorical restriction, prison officials would have some
valid concerns regarding cost, at least as they relate to under-utilization of supermax
facilities.259 As the anecdotal studies above indicate, however, supermax prisons do
not appear to have large populations of overclassified inmates.260 The effect on utilization rates will therefore be small, and resources spent on the variable costs of housing
an additional inmate at a supermax can be reallocated to guarding against behavior
256

See infra text accompanying notes 292–95; see also Armed Career Criminal Act, 18
U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2006); West & Sabol, supra note 79, at 21.
257
See DeMaio, supra note 9, at 215–16. The author cites several reasons for the high cost
of operating supermax prisons, including a higher staff-to-inmate ratio, a prohibition on
employing inmates for low wages, special training for staff, and expensive improvements to
the facility.
258
Id. at 215.
259
See id. at 248 (noting if standards for admission “are applied strictly, [Wisconsin’s
Supermax] would likely end up with a large number of empty beds”).
260
See supra Part I.C (detailing recent investigative work uncovering anecdotal evidence
of only a few overclassified inmates at supermax facilities). But see Gawande, supra note 13
(stating most inmates in prolonged solitary confinement are not highly dangerous).
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issues of the worst of the worst.261 If the number of truly dangerous inmates is less
than the number of overclassified inmates at Supermaxes, states may actually save
money on variable costs of incarceration due to the restriction. Moreover, if supermax
utilization is adversely impacted more than originally expected, states can follow the
lead of Virginia and downgrade a supermax to a lower-security facility.262
Moreover, such a discussion of cost does not consider the costs to overclassified
inmates, which in turn impose externalities on society. As DeMaio notes, an inmate
assigned to a supermax, despite being more deserving of a lower-security institution,
loses “valuable opportunities for work, education and rehabilitative treatment.”263 Work
and education opportunities at Supermaxes are severely limited and often nonexistent,264
and the psychological toll of prolonged solitary confinement negates any rehabilitative
effect incarceration might otherwise have.265 For overclassified inmates—more likely
to be re-released into society earlier than prisoners with a history of violent crime—
this represents a potentially significant opportunity cost, with the inmate re-entering
society having experienced an atrophy of any interpersonal or economic skills he may
have once possessed.266 Aggregated over the entire class of overclassified inmates, these
opportunity costs could represent a significant loss of productivity for society. Finally,
society may face additional costs from antisocial behavior resulting from the psychological toll of long periods of isolation.267 A constitutional prohibition on housing
juvenile and nonviolent offenders at Supermaxes avoids these individual and societylevel costs.
2. Prison Safety Concerns
The second area of concern for prison administrators—prison safety—is also
unlikely to be significantly impacted. This proposal removes one option from the toolbox of disciplinary methods for, at best, marginally problematic inmates; however, the
261

See DeMaio, supra note 9, at 219 (describing the high variable cost of filling a bed at
a supermax facility).
262
See Institutions by Security Levels, supra note 254 (noting the downgrade of Wallens
Ridge State Prison from supermax to a “Level Five” Security Facility).
263
DeMaio, supra note 9, at 218.
264
See supra Part I.B (observing inmates at many supermax facilities are confined to their
small cells for up to twenty-three hours a day).
265
See Haney & Lynch, supra note 58, at 530–33.
266
See DeMaio, supra note 9, at 219. The author observes the inmate may also carry “the
stigma of having been a ‘supermax’ inmate” with him, either in society or at a lower-security
prison facility. Id.
267
See Jessica Pupovac, Torture in Our Own Backyards: The Fight Against Supermax
Prisons, THE REAL COST OF PRISON WEBLOG (Mar. 24, 2008, 9:36 AM), http://realcostofprisons
.org/blog/archives/control_unitsshusupermax/index.html (discussing legislative and academic
commentary pointing out the lack of evidence to corroborate rehabilitative effectiveness of
supermax prisons).
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removed option is the most extreme and is made unavailable only for low-risk inmates
committing minor infractions. The proposal for a categorical restriction is founded on
a rationale of proportionality and culpability. Thus, due to the potential for great harm
to overclassified inmates, the new approach applies constitutional standards to the
choice prison officials should make anyway on grounds of effective administration of
prisons and inmates. For nonviolent and juvenile offenders with only minor disciplinary
problems, prison officials retain a wide array of punitive methods at their disposal. And
if such inmates wrongly believe themselves to be untouchable due to the new constitutional protection and exhibit dangerous and/or violent behavior, prison officials are
then free to transfer the inmate to a supermax at their discretion.
E. Legal Counter-Arguments
Legal scholars and practitioners favorably disposed to Wilson’s two-part conditions
test268 and harsher punishments for criminals as a means of deterrence and retribution
may raise several objections to this proposal. One possible challenge posits that judges
inexperienced with the administration of prison facilities should not be substituting
their judgments for those of incarceration officials on the ground.269 A second possible
legal challenge would contend that a punishment such as assignment to a supermax
prison is not the official “penalty formally imposed for a crime,”270 thus requiring a
challenge of general prison conditions under different standards than adjudication of
a Cruel and Unusual Punishment claim.271 The Supreme Court held in Wilson that a
challenge aimed at general conditions “require[s] inquiry into [the] state of mind”272
of prison officials, finding an Eighth Amendment violation only if said officials acted
with deliberate indifference to the inmate’s plight.273 This Subsection lays out the
counterpoints to each argument.
1. Judicial Deference
Regarding the first argument on the value of judicial deference, this Note does not
dispute the principle that courts should not unnecessarily tie the hands of officials on
the ground. Prison administrators are in the best position to make decisions to protect
the safety of inmates and staff, and any sound Eighth Amendment categorical restriction
268

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 302 (1991).
Justice Scalia, in his majority opinion in Wilson, cautions that “officials act in response
to a prison disturbance, [and thus] their actions are necessarily taken ‘in haste, under pressure,’
and balanced against ‘competing institutional concerns for the safety of prison staff or other
inmates.’” Id. at 302 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986)).
270
Id.
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Id.
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on supermax assignments should account for this fact.274 The response to this argument,
however, is similar to the response to prison administrators concerned with the potential
impact on prison safety.275 The categorical restriction against assigning overclassified
inmates to Supermaxes finds inherent support from the existence of over-classification
itself—such inmates do not deserve to be sent to Supermaxes yet end up there anyway.
This administrative decision, previously made on practical grounds of efficiency and
inmate outcomes, is only evaluated under constitutional standards due to the severe
psychological harm that prolonged solitary confinement in a supermax inflicts on overclassified inmates.276 To paraphrase Justice Scalia, when emergency conditions arise
that threaten the safety of persons inside a prison, prison officials retain the option to
transfer dangerous and violent inmates to supermax regardless of their previous state
of less culpability, as the inmates have now lost their status as overclassified.277
Therefore, the proposed categorical restriction cannot be said to be an instance
of judicial overreach into an area properly reserved for the executive branch of states
or the federal government.278 Rather, the court would be acting within its proper role
as the protector of an individual’s rights against the power and coercion of the government. A court would step in and make requirements of prison officials only if an
inmate has been unnecessarily sent to a supermax prison and is experiencing punishment grossly disproportionate to the gravity of his offense.
2. Supermax Is Not the Formal Penalty Imposed for the Crime
The argument that an assignment to a supermax is not the formal penalty imposed for a criminal conviction—and thus that related Eighth Amendment challenges
should be decided under a different framework—is more complex and may depend
on the circumstances surrounding the inmate’s original prison assignment. The Court
in Wilson states that “[i]f the pain inflicted is not formally meted out as punishment
by the statute or the sentencing judge, some mental element must be attributed to the
inflicting officer before it can qualify.”279 This rule appears to be applicable at least
in cases in which incarceration officials transfer inmates to Supermaxes based on
disruptive behavior.
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The Supreme Court has noted another likely concern of prison administrators—the
possibly high cost of improving facility conditions—has not been advanced as a factor or
defense to a “cruel and unusual punishment” claim regarding conditions of confinement.
Wilson, 501 U.S. at 301–02 (“At any rate, the validity of a ‘cost’ defense as negating the
requisite intent is not at issue in this case . . . . Nor, we might note, is there any indication
that other officials have sought to use such a defense . . . .”).
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The response is twofold. First, an overclassified inmate assigned to a supermax
directly after sentencing experiences the supermax as the formal penalty for his crime
for all practical purposes. The inmate never had an opportunity to demonstrate his
lower level of culpability, along with acceptance of responsibility for his actions and
good behavior, at a less restrictive facility. In the federal system, the final decision of
prison placement rests with the Bureau of Prisons within the Department of Justice;
defendants and sentencing judges generally make only requests and recommendations
for specific facilities or locations.280 Courts have previously found a significant distinction between Supermaxes and less restrictive facilities,281 however, and thus they
should exercise their judicial power to declare certain facilities off-limits for juvenile
and nonviolent offenders.
Second, if an overclassified inmate is transferred to a supermax for disciplinary
reasons, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Wilson notes that such transfers are the
punishment imposed for a crime and are thus subject to proportionality review.282 In
a footnote, Scalia describes the concurring opinion’s argument that all prison conditions constitute punishment regardless of the intent of prison officials.283 Scalia finds
“no basis for that position in principle,”284 moving on to analyze the case law the concurrence cites.285 Discussing Hutto v. Finney,286 Scalia finds the only element at issue
is “punitive isolation” or solitary confinement.287 Punitive isolation, Scalia observes,
“is self-evidently inflicted with punitive intent”288 and is thus punishment to which
the Eighth Amendment fully applies.289
In the situation of an overclassified inmate transferred to a supermax for minor behavioral infractions, the transfer is effectively a sentence formally imposed for a crime
and does not require inquiry into the state of mind of relevant prison officials. Thus, the
only remaining situation not covered above, whereby an overclassified inmate finds
himself at a supermax, is if the inmate is transferred from a lower-security facility to
the supermax for administrative reasons such as overcrowding. The Supreme Court in
Wilson, however, noted in dicta that concerns regarding fiscal constraints could not
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“control the meaning of ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ in the Eighth Amendment”290
and, as such, a “‘cost’ defense” is likely never valid.291
CONCLUSION
Any skepticism that the proposed categorical restriction would be too soft on
hardened criminals or endanger prison safety is hopefully alleviated after the discussion of counter-arguments above. The targets of this proposal are not, for example,
terrorist suspects the United States seeks to extradite for prosecution;292 rather, they
are undeserving inmates such as David Tracy293 and the inmate sent to Wisconsin’s
Supermax at the age of sixteen.294 These inmates do not have the level of culpability
that justifies confinement in a supermax, and thus the potential costs resulting from
the severe psychological trauma inherent in prolonged solitary confinement are much
higher. Proper safeguards should be in place to prevent these inmates from experiencing such brutal conditions.
Graham opened the door to extending proportionality-based categorical restrictions to punishments beyond the death penalty, granting courts the ability to help more
prison inmates facing punishments grossly disproportionate to their crimes.295 Past
attempts to help these inmates—including challenges grounded in international law,
facial challenges against all Supermaxes, and due process claims challenging procedures for transfer to Supermaxes—have only partially succeeded at best.296 Courts
should recognize the validity of the underlying goals of such claims, and protect the
individuals most in need of help in these cases through a categorical restriction on
assigning overclassified inmates to supermax prisons.
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Id. at 302. Another possible legal counter-argument is that the drafters of the Eighth
Amendment did not intend to have courts engage in proportionality review, and alternatively
that the proposal in this Note carries proportionality review too far. See Graham v. Florida,
130 S. Ct. 2011, 2044 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Regarding the former argument, a broad
discussion of the inclusion of proportionality review in the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause is beyond the scope of this Note; it is sufficient to observe that six members of the
Supreme Court in Graham engaged in proportionality review in one form or another. See id.
at 2036 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). Regarding the latter argument, extending categorical restrictions to cover prolonged solitary confinement flows directly out of the principle of proportionality review—“a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and
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